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Voting via the Internet has become a feasible option for 
political as well as non-political ballots. However, there 
are many obstacles which have to be overcome, especially 
legal restrictions have to be transformed into technical 
and security solutions. The article starts with a brief 
presentation of advantages and disadvantages of Internet 
ballots and presents application fields and pilot schemes. 
Then, technological security aspects are derived due to 
democratic basic principles. Especially the applied voting 
procedures are critical in security terms. Hence, the most 
relevant cryptographic protocols are presented and their 
drawbacks and shortcomings are identified. However, 
this article does not propose a new voting protocol. 
Beyond fixing cryptographic procedures for ballots, more 
elements are to be specified, e.g. responsibilities and 
rights of involved authorities or security precautions 
regarding  hardware and software. For this reason, a 
structural security framework for electronic voting 
systems is presented which can be used for their 





Voting via the Internet is part of electronic government 
and electronic democracy. However, there are many 
obstacles which have to be overcome, especially legal 
restrictions have to be transformed into technical and 
security solutions. In the second section the article 
discusses advantages and disadvantages of Internet 
elections. The third section shows different application 
fields, and presents important international pilot schemes 
(political and business ones). Due to democratic basic 
principles (general, direct, free, equal, and secret 
elections), technological security aspects are derived in 
section four. Especially the applied voting procedures are 
critical in security terms. Hence, the fifth section presents 
the most relevant cryptographic protocols also giving a 
brief overview about the most important general concepts 
of cryptography. Drawbacks and shortcomings of these 
protocols are identified showing the necessity to extend 
them or to develop new ones. However, this article does 
not propose a new protocol. 
Beyond fixing cryptographic procedures for ballots, 
more elements are to be specified, e.g. responsibilities and 
rights of involved authorities or security precautions 
regarding  hardware and software. For this reason, in 
section six a structural security framework for electronic 
voting systems is presented which can be used for their 
composition and analysis. 
 
2. Pros and cons 
 
Substantial general arguments for the implementation 
of online elections are the following ones [24]: 
Increasing turnout: As Internet voting is an  
additional channel for eligible voters the turnout might  
increase substantially. Especially for older, handicapped, 
or sick people or those who cannot go or travel to their 
polling station it is a voting option. 
Cost reduction: Cost savings can occur, if less 
personnel for performing absentee voting and for 
counting is necessary or if travel activities are reduced. 
On the other hand building up and operating the poll 
infrastructure as well as equipping the voters with 
essential hardware cause cost (see section four). 
Furthermore, in the foreseeable future of political 
elections no polling stations will become obsolete. The 
discussion whether and at which elections cost savings 
will occur is presently speculative. 
Decrease of invalid votes: Invalid votes can be 
produced consciously or unconsciously. Consciously 
producing invalid votes  are presumably protest against 
politics in general, therefore they must be provided in 
online elections. Unconsciously produced invalid votes 
could be already identified at “feeding time“ with 
plausibility checks, so that the voting software could point 
out this mistake. This means a difference to traditional 
polling booths. Whether this kind of restricting the 
democratic “principle of equality” is  tolerable has to be 
examined legally. 
Lower election fraud in endangered countries: The 
security of traditional elections bases on the confidence in 
persons and in the independence of election committees. 
For example, in the context of German political polls in 
any polling station at any time there are several persons 
belonging to different parties, and the counting takes 
place at another location by other people. In endangered 
countries with young democracies the confidence in these 
mechanisms is lower, and a shift from organizational 
security precautions to technical ones (e.g. cryptographic 
coding) might be helpful. However, it is necessary to 
mention that the coexistent use of organizational and 
technical security precautions features a gradual 
character, i.e. the securest technology can always be 
annulled, if all organizational units involved cooperate 
corruptingly. 
Support of basis democracy: As soon as an Internet-
based poll infrastructure is built up basis-democratic 
voting processes become more feasible.  
On the other hand there is strong concern about online 
elections [24]: 
Security: Ranking first is security doubt. In traditional 
elections it is obvious for anyone that a mapping of voters 
on the votes is impossible, because the voting process 
itself takes place behind physical barriers and each voter 
drops his “locked“ envelope into the voting box, which 
also contains the envelopes of many other voters. The 
voter himself monitors the adherence of the principle of 
secrecy. However, regarding absentee voting which is 
socially, political and legally accepted this looks 
different: There is no guarantee to the voter that his vote 
won’t be changed, he just trusts in the integrity of the 
involved persons and organizations as well as in the 
sanctity of the mail. These and many further aspects of 
election security like the warranty of the ballot paper’s 
“arrival” don’t come up to discussion, probably for habit 
reasons or as they are implicitly sensed as realized. 
Rightfully, in the context of Internet polls security aspects 
are addressed again. The California Internet Voting Task 
Force [2] is concerned about the security of computer 
clients, as the presence of worms, viruses and Trojan 
horses can not be sufficiently surely excluded. 
Technological voting security is multi-faceted, section 
four addresses it more detailed. 
In this context it is interesting to notice that the 
German Constitutional Court classified absentee voting as 
legal two times in 1967 and 1981 [18]), although it does 
not guarantee keeping the principle of secrecy to a degree 
traditional polls with voting stations do, because spouses 
or friends could watch them voting. Important to know is 
that (1) a conclusive prevention reason has to be present 
and (2) at the times of these decisions the portion of 
absentee voters was quite small (5-7%). If necessary a 
renewed examination is advised. 
As Internet voting is a remote election procedure, too, 
it could be treated equally or similarly. 
Low Transparency: Obviously, implementing 
security requirements with information technology is not 
trivial, even if cryptography offers a rich bundle of 
methods and instruments. Anyway, using complex 
security procedures leads to increased intransparency to 
the voter, so that problems regarding elector’s acceptance 
are likely. 
Cost: It is yet unknown, to what extend and when cost 
for establishing and operating an Internet-based poll 
infrastructure redeems. Disputants of Internet elections 
deny its’ potential to medium-term cost savings. 
 
3. Application fields and pilot schemes 
 
   Seminal application fields for online elections are 
especially large-scale ballots with a tremendous 
organizational work. Polls in small communities like 
schools or for municipal councils are regarded to a lesser 
extend, rather political elections like diet elections, 
elections to the German Bundestag, referendums, or EU 
elections, polls within a corporation (workers’ council, 
board of directors), votes at stockholders’ meetings or 
other annual meetings, or committee elections at 
universities and schools. 
Remarkably there is a broad consensus that political 
online voting is not meant to be substitutional rather 
complementary to traditional voting procedures. There is 
no such consensus about non-political polls. 
There are several ways to execute Internet votes. The 
California Internet Voting Task Force [2] differentiates 
the place from where the vote is casted via Internet, 
referring to a plan by stages: Vote via Internet at 
1. a dedicated polling station 
2. any polling station 
3. a certified voting terminal (e.g. at a public place) 
4. from any access point 
This article focuses requirements and experiences with 
stage no. 4.  
Pilot projects in political and non-political 
environments have been accomplished [25]. Due to their 
exceptional position and legal meaning political elections 
will be considered first.  
 
3.1. Political elections 
 
Security concerns are surely high when voting online 
within political range. Not only poll specific laws must be 
observed but also constitutional principles. Up to now no 
such election has taken place in Germany. According to a 
statement of the current Federal Minister of the Interior 
Otto Schily polling stations (approx. 80,000 in Germany) 
shall be equipped with voting computers for the 
forthcoming election to the German Bundestag in 2006. 
The first Internet election is planned to take place in 2010 
[18]. 
In 2000 approx. 250 soldiers could use a “certified 
virus-free” computer to participate in the US-presidential 
election. Unfortunately, there is only few information 
about the Internet voting procedure [18]. As mentioned 
above in 2000 about 40,000 entitled voters used the 
opportunity to cast their vote online during Democratic 
Party’s Presidential Primary election [8]. This vote has 
been accompanied by election.com and was discussed in 
detail [15;19]. Several security problems occurred, e.g. 
denial-of-service attacks as well as the uncertainty of the 
voter, if his vote was really counted. 
As mentioned above in 2003 for the first time in 
Switzerland the Geneva suburb Anières accomplished an 
official Internet election within the scope of a municipal 
project; about 28% of the eligible voters elected online 
[11]. To what extent this percentage just based on the 
innovative character and publicity is not known. 
Furthermore there is no information about emerged 
security problems. 
 
3.2. Non-political elections 
 
Elections at universities and schools are also classified 
as non-political ones although they might have a political 
facet. There have been already numerous pilot schemes in 
different countries and contexts. The “Forschungsgruppe 
Internetwahlen” supported by the Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Technology contributed some pioneer 
work in Germany and created a special voting software 
called i-vote. Several ballots have been accomplished 
with this software, for example in February 2000 the 
representatives for the student parliament at the university 
of Osnabrück could be voted electronically [17]. 
Philippsen [18] took a closer look at the student 
parliament election and identified some security 
problems. Furthermore he found fault that the exact 
procedure is still confidential and yet no source code has 
been published. 
With support of the German Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Work in 2002 the project W.I.E.N. 
(Elections in electronic nets) was initiated aiming at 
developing and testing online voting procedures in 
economy. Coexistently, the German Federal Ministry of 
the Interior tries for getting experience with political 
online elections. 
Internationally-active is election.com which 
accomplished numerous polls via Internet. Beside the 
Democratic Party’s Presidential Primary election the 
company was also assigned to execute an election for the 
English Sheffield City Council, for the Australian 
Information Industry Association, and to the student 
parliament at the University of Technology in Auckland. 
3.3. Security 
 
Various activities in the field of online voting motivate 
a closer look at security requirements which have to be 
satisfied by such elections. On one hand not all security 
problems are published right away, on the other hand due 
to still moderate attacks some might have not been 
detected yet. With an increasing number of online 
elections these attacks will certainly become more 
seriously and systematically. For this reason the author 
pleads for numerous pilot projects with complete 
transparency of used procedures and infrastructures. 
Attack efforts should be explicitly welcome in order to 
identify weak points. In cryptology this proceeding 
worked outstandingly.   
 
4. Security requirements 
 
Legal, political science based, and social requirements 
on elections are deep-seated in appropriate laws and have 
been primarily addressed with organizational measures so 
far. For example, physical barriers contribute to ballots’ 
secrecy and the legally prescribed temporal restriction of 
vote casting is implemented with opening times of the 
polling stations. Absentee voting already requires a 
special treatment and had to be legally anchored. In order 
to guarantee a ballot’s secrecy the sanctity of the mail was 
consulted, but the legal anchorage of Internet elections 
will probably become even harder. Information 
technology opens a new dimension, which has to 
accommodate legal general conditions. In other words, 
these basic conditions and laws must be technologically 
implemented in Internet elections. Technological efforts 
may not be an end in itself, but they make for 
implementation of those basic conditions. One can also 
call it a mapping of basic conditions on technological 
components. Beyond that further requirements occur, in 
particular economic and ergonomic ones, i.e. Internet 
elections should be as inexpensive and user-friendly as 
possible (see figure 1). 
In the context of integrating Internet elections in 
society and comprehensive requirements for them 
Kubicek et al. [14] use the expression “interdisciplinary 
connectivity”. Already in 1996 Cranor [5] formulated 
general requirements for electronic elections.  
 Figure 1 doesn’t show all dependencies, but the 
arrows indicate the most important ones. The 
technological security requirements are part of the critical 
technological requirements, as legal requirements take 
effect especially on them. They are focused below. 
The necessity to systematically analyze security 
requirements is substantiated by the security problems 




Figure 1. System of requirements 
 
The accurate security conditions depend on the 
concrete election. For example, a country-wide political 
ballot requires different instruments than a local or 
regional student parliament election. Nevertheless at least 
the election-oriented democratic principles as fixed in the 
German “Grundgesetz” (constitutional law) can be 
consulted as starting point for the formulation of security-
technological requirements. Supplementing, at each case 
further legal basic conditions are to be considered, e.g. 
electoral laws (horizontal expansion of requirements). It 
is conceivable that for certain ballot types different sets of 
requirements will be set up. It should be stressed that 
concrete security arrangements of an election aim at 
accomplishing a ballot-specific security level (vertical 
expansion of requirements), since getting at absolute 
security seems to be impossible. 
Even in polling stations the corrupting cooperation of 
the canvassers cannot be ruled out reliably. Furthermore, 
sending the vote via mail  the voter cannot be sure that his 
vote will arrive and be considered. 
In the German “Grundgesetz” they say (translated): ”In 
the counties and townships the people must have 
representatives which have been elected in general, direct, 
free, equal, and secret elections.” They also say:” The 
representatives of the ‘Bundestag’ are voted in direct, 
free, equal, and secret elections.” 
Including the juridical-oriented discussion of Ruess 
[21] one can bridge from law to technology: 
General election: The basic principle “generality” 
assures the option to vote to all eligible voters. Since 
voting via Internet represents an additional way to voting, 
there seems to arise no problem. However, it has to be 
discussed whether the breakdown of technical system 
components limits the general right to vote, if five 
minutes before the end of voters’ time slot no connection 
to the polling server can be established due to its capacity 
overload. Thinking in terms of a client-server-architecture 
the following requirements result: On the client side the 
voting software and hardware (card reader, for instance) 
must work properly.  The voter is partially in charge for 
this, as he has to ensure that on its computer no disturbing 
software runs, which makes the network device fail, e.g. 
The same applies to the server side, but it might be easier 
to handle this due to the controllable environment. One of 
the largest problems is the disturbance of a network 
connection basing on a (partial) Internet breakdown. For 
example, denial of service attacks can paralyze routers 
and polling servers. The author claims that an absolute 
reliability of all assigned systems cannot be guaranteed. 
Yet, due to the coexistence of traditional voting channels 
the question whether such a reliability has to be 
guaranteed at all arises. 
Direct election: The ballot’s directness means that 
between casting of votes and their counting only the 
mathematical determination may occur, thus no electors 
may be instituted. This is a matter of no importance in the 
context of Internet elections, even though the 
implementation of election processes has to fulfill this 
requirement. 
Free election: According to this principle the poll 
procedure must not be affected by public force or private 
pressure. In this regard, to the Internet elections the same 
items and doubts apply as in case of absentee voting, 
because preventing an influencing control technologically 
is impossible. Lodging the claim that the voter receives a 
proof that his vote was counted unchanged one can think 
of a receipt mechanism, which however must not show 
the vote’s content. Lacking provableness is against 
extortion and paid votes. 
Equal election: The principle of equality subsumes two 
aspects: (1) All voting cards are to be granted some status, 
so that those in the Internet must have the same 
appearance and the same structure as all other voting 
cards. Demanding the use of dedicated hardware (chip-
card reader with integrated display and input device), 
consequently the same requirements are to be made 
against this hardware. Particularly, the voting card as a 
whole has to be displayed and may not be implicitly 
weighted by the “scrolling feature”. Although these are no 
technological security requirements, but only 
technological ones, it discloses that legal implications 
shown in figure 1 do not only refer to security aspects. (2) 
Regarding the individual voter it must apply strictly that 
each vote has same weight. This means first that any 
eligible voter may only vote once (authentication is 
necessary). In order to implement authentication (and 
authorization) digital signatures can be applied. Secondly, 
it means that any vote has to be supplied unaltered 
(integrity). It must be assured that no malfunctioning or 
cankered software (viruses, worms, Trojan horses etc.) 
changes the vote notelessly. This can probably only be 
ensured if secure auxiliary hardware featuring a peculiar 
display and input device (e.g. keyboard) is applied. An 
example of use is online banking with HBCI (Home 
Banking Computer Interface) where dedicated chip-card 
reader are used [26]. Moreover, the vote must not be 
corrupted during its transfer. For this purpose, proven 
cryptographic methods can be consulted. Furthermore, the 
vote must not be changed on any election server. The 
implementation of this requirement calls for additional 
infrastructural and organizational measures. Thirdly, the 
electronic vote may not be copied by anyone. 
Secret election: The keeping of vote secrecy together 
with the consideration of equality and the aligned 
integrity belong to the most difficult tasks. In this regard, 
accepting absentee voting a compromise was already 
made. Compromising attacks can occur at the same spots 
already discussed above: Malicious software scanning 
data possibly run on the voter’s computer. Also remote 
administration software can intervene here. The 
transmission of all data to voting servers must be 
encoded. On vote servers’ side is has to be ensured that 
no mapping from voter on his vote decision is possible. 
Beyond public key infrastructures this also requires 
organizational measures. For instance, there is a strict 
necessity to have at least two entities: a voting host 
controlling authorization and authentication, not being 
able to read the vote, making it anonymous, and 
forwarding votes to a voting box (or many) which just 
counts the (anonymous) votes. 
If one considers further aspects of various electoral 
laws, then additional requirements appear, e.g. meeting 
dedicated time slots. 
In order to validate and verify a technological voting 
system the set of technological security requirements has 
to be consulted systematically. Section six sketches a 
possibly helpful framework. As voting protocols form the 
core of election infrastructures and significantly influence 
the security the next section sketches its’ cryptographic 
principles. 
 
5. Cryptographic voting concepts 
 
Proposed concepts for implementing electronic 
elections base on cryptographic procedures. Fundamental 
work was done by Diffie & Hellman [7] concerning 
asymmetric encoding and by Rivest, Shamir & Adleman 
[20] concerning digital signatures and public key systems. 
In principle, each person gets a pair of keys consisting of 
a private key (only the person itself knows the number) 
and a public key. If Bernhard wants to send an encoded 
message to Bianca he just applies the encoding function 
on the message and her public key. Using the 
corresponding decoding function only Bianca can decode 
the encoded message as she needs her private key. 
Systems basing on these mechanisms are called “public 
key crypto(systems)” and are widely spread nowadays. 
Digital signature procedures use the keys in inverse order: 
Bernhard signs a document by using his private key (and 
the decoding function, not the coding function). If 
applying the coding function (not the decoding function) 
on the signed message and the public key of Bernhard 
results in the original message then Bernhard must have 
signed it because he is the only one who knows his 
private key. Crucial in security context are the generation 
and distribution of the keys. 
Many voting protocols basing on cryptographic 
elements have been proposed: [1;6;10;12;16;22] belong to 
the most important ones; Schlifni [23] presents a good 
survey. Obviously, a secure election system consists of 
more than just one organizational unit or else the only 
unit could map the vote on the voter. Consequently, 
maintaining the voters’ list must be separated from 
counting the votes. Among the approaches implementing 
this division of powers two of the most important ones are 
sketched below. 
 
5.1. Trustworthy entities 
 
Beside the entity responsible for generating and 
distributing keys we need an administrator (sometimes 
called validator) who is responsible for maintaining the 
list of voters and a collector (sometimes called psephor) 
who collects and counts the votes. The procedure 




Figure 2. Voting procedure with trustworthy 
entities 
 
Each voter, the administrator as well as the counter get 
a private key and a public key. The counter also gets an 
identifier (ID) with which he is associated in the voters 
list. The voter completes his ballot paper and encodes it 
with the public key of the counter, then he signs it (with 
his private key). Together with his ID he encodes it with 
the public key of the administrator. The administrator gets 
this message and decodes it with his private key - he is 
the only one who knows this key – getting the voter’s ID. 
In addition to this he also has to check if the message is 
authentic: this is possible by using the public key of the 
person associated with the ID.  It is important to remark 
that the administrator cannot identify the voter’s decision; 
it remains the ballot paper encoded with the counter’s 
public key. Finally the administrator signs this encoded 
ballot paper with his private key ensuring that the counter 
can verify the sender (the administrator). Knowing the 
public key of the administrator and the own private key 
the counter gets a(n) (anonymous) vote. 
Apparently, this procedure has some weaknesses [18, 
p. 143f]: 
? The administrator can destroy and add votes. 
? The counter can change, destroy, or add votes. 
? If the administrator and the counter cooperate, then 
a secret election is not guaranteed. 
Concerning a secret election you have to trust the 
entities. A more complex procedure not requiring this 
faith uses blind signatures and anonymous 
communication channels. 
 
5.2. Blind signatures and anonymous channels 
 
This procedure bases on Fujioka et al. [10] and uses 
the same entities as the “procedure of trustworthy 
entities”, but differs from it regarding these essential 
items: 
? The voter doesn’t have to trust any entity, 
moreover he can detect any malpractice of 
administrator and counter. 
? Not the administrator, but the voter is responsible 
for sending his vote to the counter. 
? The communication between voter and counter 
takes place via anonymous communication 
channels. 
Figure 3 shows the procedure. 
Each voter possesses another pair of keys valid for just 
one election and (in the beginning) only known to the 
voter. The voter needs this pair in order to check if his 
vote was counted correctly. First, the ballot paper is 
encoded with the first vote-specific key; this encoding 
gets reversed not until the procedure’s end meaning that 
no one except the voter knows his decision as long as the 
voter keeps his second (vote-specific) key private. Then a 
blind signature is applied: this concept is illustrated by 
analogy to carbon-paper-lined envelopes. If you seal a 
slip of paper inside such an envelope and a signature 
mark is later made on the outside, then when you open the 
envelope, the slip will bear the signature mark’s carbon 
image. 
The voter puts his encoded ballot paper together with 
his identifier (ID) into such an envelope and sends it 
(signed with his private key and encoded with the 
administrator’s public key) to the administrator; from the 
algorithmic point of view the voter uses a random 
number. Only the administrator can read the message and 
check the authenticity. He notes the ID and the voter’s 
activity, signs the envelope with his private key (without 
knowing the envelope’s content), encodes the signed 
envelope with the voter’s public key, and sends it back to 
the voter. The voter has to remove the blinding envelope 
resulting in a ballot paper signed by the administrator. He 
then encodes this signed envelope with the counter’s 
public key and sends it to the counter. This 
communication takes place via anonymous channels [4] 




Figure 3. Voting procedure with blind signatures 
and anonymous channels 
 
After receiving the anonymous (and still encoded) vote 
the counter assigns a number to this vote and publishes 
this number together with the encoded vote in a result list 
in the Internet. The number is sent back to the voter via 
the same anonymous channels which have kept the 
connection. At this time the vote is still encoded. 
Later the voter sends the second vote-specific key 
together with the number (via anonymous channels) to the 
counter who can then decode the vote (associated to the 
number) and transparently documents the correct 
counting of this vote in the vote list in the Internet. 
Drawbacks of this procedure are the following ones: 
? Due to the complexity the implementation is 
difficult and error-prone. 
? The voter gets a receipt of his vote which can be 
used for demonstrating his decision. 
? Under certain circumstances (uncooperative 
behavior of the voter) an intermediate counting is 
possible: vote counting is possible as soon as the 
counter gets the second key which, ideally, is send 
not until the election’s end. 
    
6. Framework for voting systems 
 
Although voting protocols are the core of voting 
systems they cannot work without corresponding 
organizations (e.g. voting authorities), data (e.g. digital 
certificates), functions (e.g. encoding and decoding 
algorithms), and computers (special hardware and 
software). Together with Protocols and their linking 
function they form an abstract framework that might be 




Figure 4. Framework for electronic voting 
systems 
 
As security requirements always have to apply to the 
whole system – any insecure element can compromise the 
entire (voting) system – design tasks and security analysis 
of voting systems have to account for each element; a 
security specification of a voting system can become 
operationalized by specifications of the five elements.  
Data: Different kind of data appear during an election 
and content as well as structure have to be defined. First, 
there is the electronic ballot paper sometimes signed by a 
voting authority to make it valid. Secondly, we have 
digital certificates which allow to prove identities and 
encode data in order to make it readable only for a 
selected person or institution. Unfortunately, there are 
many incompatible standards for digital certificates, e.g. 
X.509 [13],  SPKI [9], and OpenPGP [3]. If biometric 
data is used for identification one has to define how 
fingerprints, facial recognition data, or/and iris scan data 
are stored. Thirdly, the votes itself must be stored. Fourth, 
a big problem are vote receipts. If used, should they 
contain the voter’s decision or mustn’t they?  
Functions: Core aspects are algorithms for encoding 
and decoding (including key length), signature algorithms 
as well as algorithms for blind signatures and anonymous 
channels. Where applicable, precise biometric 
identification algorithms must be applied. 
Authorities: Different authorities have been proposed 
for making a ballot secure. Many voting protocols in 
literature integrate a validator, a psephor, and a 
certification authority (see section five). Beyond the 
question which authorities are involved in elections their 
responsibilities, rights, and even protection precautions 
regarding rooms, servers, etc. have to be specified. 
Hardware and Software: At each side security 
requirements for hardware and software are important. 
Regarding the voter’s PC at home think about 
malfunctioning software (viruses, worms, Trojan horses, 
etc.) that could change, delete or read the voting decision 
unnoticed. A solution might be external devices like smart 
card readers with a keyboard and/or display that work as 
an interface to smart cards (with own memory and 
microprocessor). Approved or certified software can be 
stored on the smart card which is responsible for secure 
encoding and signing. Moreover on all computers only 
approved or certified software should be applied. 
Organization: The core element of electronic voting 
systems are the (static) infrastructure and the (dynamic) 
protocol subsumed as organization, as they integrate and 
combine all other elements. The protocol (see section 
five) determines the voting process: who does what with 
which data and how? The infrastructure determines which 
devices and software reside where (e.g. how many voting 
servers exist, level of redundancy) and how they are 
linked to each other including technical protocols. One of 
the most challenging security requirement is protection 
against DOS (denial of service) attacks. 
Only if each element accomplishes specified security 




There are many application fields for Internet ballots in 
political as well as in non-political context. During the 
past years many pilot projects were conducted, which 
examined Internet elections coming upon large 
commitment. However, Internet ballots make high 
demands on security and theoretical research has to be 
done regarding security aspects of data, functions, 
hardware and software, authorities, and protocols and 
infrastructure. For example, it is still open how casted 
votes should be receipted and which voting protocols 
should be used in which case. 
There is also a strong need for empirical research: not 
much experience is available concerning the practical 
implementation of Internet voting and its acceptance. 
Many problems will probably be detected first in the 
course of further pilot projects. 
Talking about Internet elections and security we 
should keep a trade-off in mind: Enlarging security also 
means an increase of effort, costs, and complexity. For 
that reason, we will carefully have to specify the level of 
security of each voting system. 
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